Intervention by the Hon. Joe Borg, Minister of Foreign Affairs, at the National Conference on the Draft Constitution – Qawra - 14 November 2003
pr1383
14/11/2003
The draft Constitution and smaller Member States
| Mr Chairman, | Excellencies, Distinguished guests, Ladies and Gentlemen, |
| Everyone present here today understands the | importance of what has been discussed during the course of this national conference. It’s timing, at a point when the present Inter-Governmental Conference will soon need to start taking the necessary hard decisions, is extremely opportune, and next Monday my colleague Minister Svoboda and myself will be once again at the table of discussions to debate further what shape the Constitutional Treaty for Europe should take. |
| The dust raised by the Treaty of Nice has not yet | even settled, and Europe has embarked on a project that, in terms of its symbolic, legal and political significance, is one of the most significant it has ever seen in times of peace. The Treaty of Nice allowed the enlargement project to proceed, a process that Malta, the Czech Republic, the other eight acceding states, and the current fifteen member states will successfully conclude next May. Nice was an adequate and effective stopgap measure, but, as was recognised at the time, it did not delve deeply into the question of the nature and future of the European Union itself, leaving a number of key issues unresolved. It was the sense, so palpable at Nice, that these questions needed to be examined in greater detail, that led to the launch of the debate on the future of Europe, the Convention that delivered the draft Constitutional Treaty last July, and the present Inter-Governmental Conference. We are all hopeful, and I am confident, that the end result of this long, yet invaluable process will be a high quality Constitutional Treaty. |
| In Laeken, Europe’s leaders recognised that the | continent’s future was too important to be decided solely by politicians or bureaucrats. The Convention on the Future of Europe thus went beyond normal policy-making procedures in the European Union. It served as an effective forum where the varying interests, views and comments of not just the member states but other key players in the making of tomorrow’s Europe could be debated and evaluated. The European citizen was directly represented in this process through Parliamentarians from both the European and National Parliaments. While not yet formally members of the Union, the fact that the acceding states participated fully in the Convention was also significant and positive, as was the participation of the Economic and Social Committee, the Committee of the Regions, and the constant dialogue with representatives from civil society. As a result, the draft Constitutional Treaty that the Convention produced is a serious text that reflects the various interests and needs of the enlarged Union, and serves as an excellent basis for the work of the Convention. This has been recognised, to varying degrees, by all the countries taking part in the Intergovernmental Conference. All appreciate that is in the interests of all that the good work done by the Convention is not dismantled, but built upon and refined. |
| So why do we feel that the draft Constitutional | Treaty for Europe is generally a positive development? |
| Primarily because it manages to achieve an acceptable | overall balance on many fronts. Most importantly it has achieved a balance between the need for efficiency on the one hand and the interests of the member states on the other. It has also managed to keep an acceptable balance between the Union’s institutions, and to ensure that – in general - the interests of small Member States have largely been respected. This does not, of course, mean that the text cannot be improved, and that small countries should not seek to obtain greater assurances that their voice in the Union will continue to be heard and respected to the degree that it is today. |
| The Maltese Government has, like other participants | in the IGC, declared its position on a number of issues that it considers of utmost importance for the effective participation of Malta in the European Union. |
| Any country within the European Union has two | parallel concerns. Firstly, it must work with the other Member States in order to develop policies for the common European good. At the same time, however, it is keenly aware of the need to safeguard its national interests back home. Thus, the weight a country’s voice carries within both the institutions of the Union, as well as in the decision-making process, is of utmost importance to all Member States alike, small or large. As unanimity becomes more difficult to achieve in a bigger Union, it has to be ensured that the decision-making process within the new European Union passes two tests. |
| Firstly, the decision-making process needs to be an | efficient one. The widespread retention of the national veto would obviously ensure that member states never have to accept decisions that they are uncomfortable with. It would also, however, be a recipe for deadlock. The Convention wisely saw this, and changed the decision-making rules in a significant number of areas from unanimity to qualified majority. |
| Secondly, however, the decision-making process must | retain legitimacy. Every one of the 25 Member and Acceding States is a democracy whose government derives its legitimacy directly from its citizens. Those Governments, come election time, will be held accountable for their actions. It must be ensured that at the once-removed level of the European Union, citizens still have, and feel that they have, the power to influence the decisions that will affect them. The retention of unanimity in some key areas such as foreign and defence policy and taxation is a reflection of this need, as are the ever-growing powers and competences of the European Parliament. |
| It is no surprise, therefore, that Malta is giving so | much importance to the question of its representation in the European Parliament. The European Parliament’s ever increasing role in the decision-making process of the European Union makes adequate representation of all Member States extremely important. Because of this, Malta firmly believes that meaningful participation in the European Parliament’s structures, including its numerous committees, is not realistic unless a Member State has at least six Parliamentarians. Malta is therefore strongly opposed to fixing the minimum threshold of MEP’s at four, and is actively seeking to have it increased to six. The same also holds true for Malta’s participation in the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. |
| For similar reasons, Malta also believes that the | Commission should be made up of one Commissioner per Member State, with all Commissioners belonging to the College with equal voting rights. While fully conscious of the fact that the Commissioner is not there to represent his country, such an arrangement ensures that the Commission is fully representative of the Union’s diversity. Malta will certainly ensure during the Inter-Governmental Conference that any final mechanism that is decided upon with regard to the Commission fully respects the principle of the equality of Member States. |
| Governments of the Member States are directly | represented in the European Council and the Council of Ministers. The draft Constitution elevates the European Council to the status of an institution, and does away with the rotating Presidency, replacing it by an elected, fixed term one. A Presidency that rotates equally between Member States at defined intervals is certainly the most egalitarian of systems, yet it has been argued that it leads to poor continuity between presidencies and, with twenty five member states, long periods between successive presidencies for each country. |
| Throughout the Convention, a number of smaller | states, including Malta, were against relinquishing the right to equal bites, as it were, of the Presidency cherry. We have therefore asked for further clarification on the role and method of selection of the elected President, and seek to assure that the role would essentially be one of giving co-ordination, continuity, impetus and visibility, and that it would not lead to the creation of another bureaucracy. |
| After much hot debate, there seems to be a consensus | emerging around the idea of Team Presidencies for the Council, with the exception of the Foreign Affairs Council, where an emerging consensus seems to favour long-term presidencies under the chairmanship of the European Minister of Foreign Affairs. |
| Malta believes that the composition of each Team | Presidency must be devised in such a way that it is representative of the Member States, and that there is an equitable distribution of portfolios over time. At the same time, we also agree with the proposal that the presidency of the General Affairs Council would rotate on a six-monthly basis between each of the Member States within the team. |
| Malta could accept the Italian Presidency proposal of | a four Member State Team Presidency lasting for two years, with the General Affairs Council being presided over by each Member State of the team in turn. On the team presidency, we prefer a 2-year presidency made up of four member states. We favour this arrangement compared to the 18-month presidency since it avoids the possibility of alternate terms with two relatively short July-December semesters. |
| We also agree that geographical equilibrium must be | referred to as a criterion for forming the group of countries for the team presidency. It is important that such equilibrium is maintained to the greatest extent possible. |
| Finally, I would like to refer to a question at the | heart of the decision making process, that is, the criteria that determine Qualified Majority Voting. I have already said that we largely agree to the extension to QMV in the areas contemplated in the Convention. There is also the important question, however, of how that qualified majority is to be determined. The definition in the draft Constitutional Treaty gives more weight to a population majority as opposed to a majority of states. Malta is as yet unconvinced that the system of weighted votes agreed upon at Nice needs to be abandoned. It is, however, open to solutions that, while giving due weight to population size in the decision-making process, fully respect and take heed of the interests of small states |
| I would also like to make reference to two issues | that Malta gives considerable importance to in the Intergovernmental Conference. Firstly, we support the inclusion of a reference to Europe’s Christian heritage in the preamble of the Constitutional Treaty not, in any way as a means of exclusion, but as a statement of historical fact. |
| Secondly we would like to see the inclusion of | Tourism as an area of complementing and supporting action, which would be a proper reflection of its importance both for Malta and the Union as a whole. |
Mr Chairman,
| It is a much-commented on fact that during every | Inter-Governmental Conference that discusses the Union’s institutions and its decision-making processes, there is a degree of argument between the larger and the smaller member states before final agreement is arrived at. |
| It is also true – but less commented upon – that | this division scarcely ever exists at other times in the Union’s life as it goes about its regular business. The reason for this is that after all the wrangling, debate and give and take, the Union has always managed to maintain the delicate balance that ensures that the interests of each, and the interests of the common European good, are safeguarded. |
| Having participated, since the 4th of | October, in the present Inter-Governmental Conference, I am today more confident than ever that we will be similarly successful in the present venture. |
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