INAUGURAL SPEECH DELIVERED BY H.E. PROF. GUIDO DE MARCO, PRESIDENT OF MALTA, ON "CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES AND CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES: THE OSCE EXPERIENCE AND ITS RELEVANCE FOR THE MEDITERRANEAN REGION" AT THE OSCE CONFERENCE IN PORT

Mr. Chairman

Distinguished delegates

It is with a sense of d'?j'? v'? and an equal degree of nostalgia that I return to address the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe. For this is a special occasion marking the 25^th anniversary of the Mediterranean dimension. We consider this as a further occasion to promote and develop this dimension so pivotal to my country's foreign policy throughout the past quarter of a century.

The road from Dipoli to Portoroz has been a long and arduous one, and in my view, the journey is far from over.

The Mediterranean, both as concept and as reality, has confounded and exhaulted thinkers and strategists, for centuries in succession. It has been the source of inspiration and exasperation, confrontation and jubilation. It has shone azure in peacetime, and reddened the skies in times of war. Nevertheless, it remains a sea among lands. And this, Mr. Chairman, is the golden thread that should run through your deliberations, here and beyond.

Common interests, common concerns and a common heritage can coagulate this region like no other as all the elements essential for this to materialise, exist. However, in reality, the Mediterranean region is still a compound of mixed interests and deep divisions, of friendships and enmities, of unending hopes and disparate illusions.

I have always viewed it, though out of personal anguish, as a time bomb with an ever-shortening fuse. And how suggestive it sounds today when a peace process that has been painstakingly drafted with the blood of innocent lives, remains for ever threatened if not severely maimed.

In promising to start thinking Mediterranean, what does the Mediterranean mean to us today when with a Cold War buried in history books and with one superpower gone? The Romans christened the Mediterranean as ‘Mare Nostrum' and with that phrase created a metaphor for the unity of their empire. According to Hattendorf, the metaphor was ‘ not only to the geography of the Roman Empire but also to its commerce, its political and military strength gathered along the shores of the Mediterranean, as well as the role of that sea as a medium of transportation and communication in the transmission of ideas, religion and culture. It was the security of travel on the Mediterranean that provided the all embracing phenomenon'.

Belgian historian Henri Pirenne, prior to Word War II, argued that " the end of antiquity and the beginning of the Middle Ages could be traced to the period in which the Mediterranean ceased to be a Roman ‘Mare Nostrum'. He contended that that particular period coincided with the rise of two distant cultures on the fringes of the Empire, the Arab oriented and the Germanic oriented. By the year 800, over the span of a century and a half, from the mid-7^th century to the end of the 8^th, this change was fully completed. The outcome was the ‘final separation of East from West'. In his volume entitled ‘Mohammed and Charlemagne' (Meridien Books, 1957), Pirenne described this historical eruption as: "a complete break, which was to continue to our own day. Henceforth, two different and hostile civilisations existed on the shores of Mare Nostrum … The sea which had hitherto been the centre of Christianity became its frontier. The Mediterranean unity was shattered."

This concept of underscoring cultural fragmentation was captured with unparalleled erudition by Fernand Braudel, who in his classical treatise ‘ The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II (Harper & Row, 1972), maintained that ‘ the two halves of the Sea, in spite of trading links and cultural exchanges maintained their autonomy and their own spheres of influence. Genuine intermingling of populations was only to be found inside each region, and within these limits it defined all barriers of race, culture and religion. All human links between different ends of the Mediterranean, by contrast remained an adventure or at least a gamble."

Yet an equally compelling viewpoint on interpreting the complexities underlying this unique region lies in John H. Pryor's work ‘Geography, Technology and War: Studies in the Maritime history of the Mediterranean (Cambridge, 1988) For him the Mediterranean is ‘ both the unique centripetal force bonding together the various peoples of its shores and also as the principal centrifugal element separating them and lying at the heart of their distinct historical developments.'

But to identify what distinguishes and what correlates the distant shores of the Mediterranean only clarifies the mist and exposes the problem bare and naked. But it does not help finding a solution to a dilemma. Either, the Mediterranean will serve as a permanent divide – at best with some positive links between the two distinct parts, at worst two sides in confrontation – or it will be a sea which unites neighbours.

Mr. Chairman

Distinguished delegates

Recent research into the early days of Malta's participation in the Dipoli Consultations of 1972 reveals that the parting brief of the Malta delegation read:

‘For Malta, security in Europe without security in the Mediterranean, is nothing but an illusion.' Those were trying times, when the Cold War permeated a clean division of Europe and a perfect superpower balance beyond; when a heavy concentration of conventional arms, backed by a nuclear complement, right at the heart of Europe was complemented by a critical concentration of naval power in the Mediterranean. The Conference was called at a time when both military alliances realized that besides the imminent need of starting a mutually balanced force reduction process in Central Europe, a process of political and security rapprochement was required to ease tension and prevent conflict.

In those early days, Europe divided by ideology, embarked on an East-West diplomatic marathon meant to introduce security and co-operation where none existed. Malta foresaw as early as Dipoli that such a vision would be incomplete if the South was ignored and the Mediterranean discarded. Psychologically fragile in the midst of an erstwhile turbulent sea, Malta's vital security interests were continuously threatened as conflicts erupted and tensions escalated. However beyond this restrictive optic, both superpowers were displaying their military hardware at sea, and in being mutually vigilant, the surrounding political climate, remained continuously volatile. The excessive concentration of military power on land and sea, in Europe and the Mediterranean, rendered the situation explosive.

Malta had no option but to serve as catalyst to a process of peace in the Mediterranean region and plea for a subsequent reduction of armed forces, for lessening of tensions and for co-operation with neighbouring Mediterranean states. Time and again, it has been argued that in so doing Malta was selfishly safeguarding its own national interests, and to this end, ignored the overall common good. History proved that this was not correct. In seeking to protect its national security interests, Malta was mainly after a concerted recognition by Europe that its regional security interests were not exclusive of, but inextricably tied to those existing in the Mediterranean, and both were mutually influential. Nevertheless, while the concept was clear and logically sound, its application remained an uphill climb.

The Mediterranean chapter of the Helsinki Final Act was the culmination of a process of persuasion which Malta undertook to create, develop, promote and establish in the CSCE process. Today, there is no denying the stark reality that security in Europe is greatly affected by a degree of security, or the lack of it, existing in the Mediterranean basis. If none other, this, in itself is a vindication of the convictions held by Malta when the principle could not, for one reason or another, be embraced and applied by the whole OSCE community. The Mediterranean Chapter of the Helsinki Final Act established the CSCE's commitment in principle to examine all aspects of Mediterranean security as a permanent feature of the CSCE/OSCE process. Such principle however was frequently held hostage to an assorted variety of circumstances, and progress therefrom, remained limited.

For the majority of the CSCE, the subsequent Follow-Up meetings in Belgrade, Madrid, Vienna and beyond were a constant reminder that European security, confidence building and disarmament measures, had a East-West focus, with the Mediterranean implying different things to different countries for different purposes. In essence, this underscored the fact that in terms of the strategic interests of both superpowers, security in Europe and security in the Mediterranean, throughout the Cold War, could not be considered as one and the same thing, but altogether different concepts, with their exclusive political and security rationale. Malta saw things differently. And it remained constant in its vision to the present day as subsequent governments have amply demonstrated.

It was only after the 1994 Budapest Summit that one could start seeing the light at the end of the tunnel. Coinciding with positive trends emerging in various parts of the Mediterranean, the OSCE rose to the occasion and sought a permanent dialogue with its Mediterranean non-Member partners which had been denied for decades. With the start of the first meetings of the Informal, Open-Ended Contact Group came the change in the misleading nomenclature then still attributed to the Mediterranean non-member states, namely that of Non-Participating Mediterranean States. It was a misnomer to consider active, interested Mediterranean countries that shared a direct stake in the future of European security, as blatantly non-participating. Solely on its initiative, Malta sought to do away with this apparent contradiction and in 1995, Mediterranean non-member States were welcomed to the OSCE community as Partners for Co-operation.

Today, Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Morocco, Tunisia and Jordan attend Summits of Heads of State and Government, Ministerial Councils, meetings with the OSCE Troika, human dimension implementation meetings, seminars on military doctrine. Today, Mediterranean Partners for Cooperation are invited for election monitoring activities, to visit OSCE long and short term missions, and are familiarized with the OSCE's instruments used in its various processes leading to democratic institution building in newly independent states. Certainly, the MPCs are being given an ever-broadening degree of exposure to the OSCE's activities both in Vienna and on the ground and this is to be lauded and encouraged. All such efforts enhance the quality of co-operation between the OSCE and its Mediterranean Partners and while serving as excellent opportunities for them to get a closer look at the operative machinery that mobilizes the Organisation, they also serve as effective and useful confidence building measures with the aim of dispelling any remaining misconceptions and bridging the cultural gaps that still, though inevitably, exist.

But the question remains. Have we done enough ? Does the substantive degree of practical content existing in the Mediterranean dimension of the OSCE reflect what could have been actually done in the span of 25 years, or is it a simulacrum of what could have possibly been achieved. In due fairness, and without diminishing the unremitting efforts and achievements that have characterized these 25 years of successive Mediterranean initiatives in the CSCE/OSCE process, I believe this Organisation can achieve much more.

What we lack are surely not ideas. On the contrary, there is an abundance of them, as I had occasion to say last Wednesday in addressing The Royal Institute for International Affairs at Chatham House on ‘Security in the Mediterranean' we are rich in initiatives, we are poor in results. Throughout the past six years, the Mediterranean dialogue taking place within the Contact Group, extended over to the annual Mediterranean Seminars in Partner capitals, has produced a flurry of interesting proposals which could embellish the Mediterranean dimension of the OSCE in no small measure. Right up to the Istanbul Summit however, there existed no institutional link or channel whereby such proposals on Mediterranean co-operation could leave ambit of the Contact Group and be brought to the attention of the executive bodies of the OSCE. It is with some satisfaction to note that on an initiative of Malta, the Charter on Security in Europe sought to redress this detachment and provided a solution to it, whereby now the Permanent Council is being called upon to examine issues and proposals that emerge from the deliberations of the Contact Group and the Mediterranean Seminars.

This is an essentially important connecting rod which should be effectively utilized and which should draw the work of the Mediterranean Contact Group closer to that of the Permanent Council. Nevertheless, it does not satisfy the contemporary crying need for a common Euro-Mediterranean dialogue in the OSCE, one shorn of long overdue disparity of status between the OSCE Participating States and their Mediterranean Partners.

Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, of communism in Europe, and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the European security idiom and what it stood for, changed completely. Cooperative security gave a new perspective to international relations. Security could no longer remain compartimentalised on outmoded notions of East and West, North and South. A global merge of superseding security issues did away with boundaries as security concerns became transboundary. Security became truly comprehensive and indivisible. A new Security architecture embracing the Euro-Mediterranean region is possibly emerging.

As we contemplate the after-effects of the Balkan crises throughout the 90's and the explosive situation in the Middle East lasting to this very day, we are all aware that security concerns effect us all.

Throughout the past three decades, Malta has tried to raise an international conscience on the vulnerability of security in the region. We have sought to argue that the best form of defence to the region's security was through co-operation and mutual understanding. We made use of the CSCE process and beyond. Throughout the 90's, during my years as Foreign Minister, a number of initiatives were introduced, each of them seeking to capitalize on the potential existing at the time, something which oscillated according to the level of optimism prevailing over the Mediterranean political scenario.

In Algiers 1990 and Malaga 1991, in the context of the Inter-Parliamentary Union, Malta launched the idea of a Council for the Mediterranean, a concept which lends itself to the practices of the Council of Europe, with its own Parliamentary and Ministerial components, applying them flexibly to the Mediterranean context. This idea gained momentum and following two IPU/CSCM conferences, with the latter convening in Malta, the idea of an Association of Mediterranean States prevailed and is currently being examined. It is relevant to point out at this stage that the IPU/CSCM emulates the ideas originally contained in the Italo-Spanish proposal, calling for the holding of a conference on security and co-operation in the Mediterranean launched in Palma de Mallorca in September 1990 on the occasion of the third CSCE Mediterranean Seminar. Ever since the first in the series way back in 1979, Malta hosted two other CSCE Mediterranean Seminar, that in 1993 and another in 1998.

During the Final Conference of the Pact on Stability in Europe held in Paris, March, 1995, Malta, launched the concept of a Stability Pact for the Mediterranean, seeking thereto to apply to the Mediterranean the principle of preventive diplomacy so successfully employed in the context of the European Stability Pact, by merging together conflicting parties in consultative processes well in advance the stage of a possible outbreak of a conflict.

Malta, together with France saw it fitting to re-introduce the said concept also in the Inaugural Conference of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) which convened in Barcelona and which nowadays is commonly referred to as the Barcelona Process. On that occasion, Malta not only threw light on the virtues and possibilities of the Pact, but through a series of ‘Reflections' also proposed a conceptual rationale and methods of application pertinent to its successful implementation.

Given that the OSCE had been designated to serve as the custodian the Stability Pact in Europe, Malta, as early as 1996, also sought to introduce the concept of a Stability Pact for the Mediterranean within the OSCE.

As the Barcelona Process is approaching the adoption of a Stability Charter for the Mediterranean to which Malta has contributed actively, it is with a sense of satisfaction that after years of continuous re-iteration of a principle that was never put in doubt, Europe is finally developing credible political awareness and will to recognize the need of reassuring and sustaining stability in a Mediterranean region whose affinity, proximity and inter-dependence with Europe, forms the basis for a future integrative process, worthy of its name and credible enough, to culminate in a true Euro-Mediterranean area.

The OSCE, as a complementary partner in Europe's evolving notion of interlocking institutions servicing peace and stability via a platform of co-operative security, should not lag behind. On the contrary, it should take heed to the call of the times. Driven by its commitment to cooperation, partnership with adjacent areas, transparency and confidence-building, it is surprising how the long-established relationship between the CSCE/OSCE process with the Mediterranean Partners for Co-operation has progressed so little over so long. If the process of confidence-building and transparency in matters concerning the Mediterranean security, directly or indirectly, is to remain confined to the interpretation embraced during the Cold War and its immediate aftermath, then the OSCE would only be side-stepping its commitment to farm out its principles enshrined in both its Charters and its original Helsinki Final Act, if not risk being caught in a conceptual time warp.

In an age when globalisation is not just the buzz word in international relations, but a uncompromising reality ushering our new millennium, it would be anachronistic in this day and age to keep the doors of our essential cooperative security fora closed to our Mediterranean neighbours and deny them the possibility of contributing to enhance a common understanding of what security and stability, unconfined by frontiers or perceptions overtaken by time and science, could mean in a Euro-Mediterranean idiom.

In this vein, may I venture to propose what may eventually season with time - an Organisation for Co-Operation and Security in Europe and the Mediterranean, OSCEM, whereby the Organisation, on realizing the interdependence existing with its Mediterranean Partners, as reflected in the OSCE Charter on European Security signed in Istanbul, in November of last year, would seek to recognize such interdependence and endorse it in its future tasks by extending its name and application also to the Mediterranean. It should not serve simply as a change in appellation, a cosmetic which serves little purpose, but a commitment to catch up with all the opportunities that were forfeited along the years, and a solid intention to re-enact them in the future.

If the OSCE evolves into an OSCEM, it will also assume relevance and potential in the context of the world's most disconcerting political crisis presently prevailing. The crisis in the Middle East, if further proof was required, confirms that security is irreversibly indivisible. The present crisis in the Middle East, is not a legacy of the Cold War, it pre-existed that situation; it was certainly accentuated by it. It was not solved by its end.

The Oslo process remains a step in the right direction. It took too much to put it in course. As we are learning from present events, it does not take a lot to put it off course.

The U.S. and President Clinton in particular have certainly tried their best to bring a negotiated solution between the parties. At this moment in time one may ask how effective is international diplomacy. Is the European Union involved in the full context of present events? The presence of Solana at Sharm al Sheikh is an assertion of the EU interest to contribute to the peace process. Ambassador Moratinos' appointment as the EU reperesentative in the Middle East process is an added indication of this interest.

This meeting with our Mediterranean partners including Israel is at the moment a good forum for bringing together some of the dramatis personae involved;not all. It is regrettable that The Palestinian Authority is not as yet a participant.

The emergence of the OSCEM, may serve as an umbrella in the difficult circumstances in the region. It has within it not only a transatlantic connection which can give an added measure of security, but it brings within its fold, twenty five years of experience in containment and evolution in the security architecture of Europe, an organisation which is the regional arrangement of peacekeeping in terms of Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations.

As I said at the beginning of the statement: the Mediterranean is essentially a sea among lands. Those forces that transformed this sea from a fountain of knowledge, a cradle of civilisation and lake of trade and peace, to a frontier separating peoples on the basis of race, religion, culture and prosperity, should work to bridge such divisions by initiating a renaissance of its old classic concept – a Renaissance of the Mediterranean as a sea of contact, co-operation, commerce and convergence.

Only a commitment to mutual understanding can prevail over the disparities that still torment the living soul of this Euro-Mediterranean region.

It is our collective duty to shoulder that responsibility.

Thank You