ADDRESS BY THE PRESIDENT OF MALTA, H.E. PROF. GUIDO DE MARCO, "A STRATEGY FOR THE MEDITERRANEAN" - CHATHAM HOUSE, LONDON

I first came to London forty years ago. Different times. What has not changed since then is the vibrancy which one feels when strolling the streets of the capital city of the old Empire, a metropolis which has adapted itself admirably to the change of times. The influence of the United Kingdom in European affairs, in the Commonwealth, at the UN through its permanent seat in the Security Council in particular, is very relevant to world peace and stability.

The Royal Institute for International Affairs seated in this historic premises, Chatham House, embodies this continuity in change, striving for and maintaining high standards in the blend of academic and pragmatic thought. Chatham House epitomises the strength of the frank exchange of ideas – the Chatham House rule – and the power of thought. For these reasons, I am glad to be here among you today to share with you some thoughts on a subject which is pertinent to us all – the Mediterranean, its potential, its future.

Defining the Mediterranean in geographical terms offers poor consolation to the politician. It has been said that politics is the art of the possible, Mediterranean politics is the art of the impossible.

To the researcher of history, the mare nostrum concept ceased to exist with the division of the Roman Empire.

To the identity-seeker, the Mediterranean provides a great divide between different cultures, civilisations and religious beliefs.

To the economist, studies reveal that the average per capita income in the EU is ten times that of the Southern Mediterranean states.

To the military strategist, the EU countries in the Mediterranean form part of the world's strongest military alliance – NATO - with Israel in the Middle East possessing the technology for nuclear weapons while the Arabs depend on conventional weapons fragmented among several countries.

To the oil analyst, the Mediterranean represents not only a major outlet for most of the Middle East oil but sees in the Middle East 65% of the world's oil reserves.

To Huntington's disciples, the Mediterranean region provides the best field for the clash of civilisations.

In spite of all these negative features which manifest the absence of a Mediterranean identity, riparian states have common interests, common concerns, and a common heritage, giving rise to a developing Mediterranean personality.

It is in this complex situation that a strategy for the Mediterranean has to be found.

Twenty-five years ago in Helsinki I, on Malta's insistence, the Final Act stated that security in Europe is to be considered in the broader context of world security and is closely linked with security in the Mediterranean as a whole; and that accordingly the process of improving security should not be confined to Europe but should extend to other parts of the world and in particular to the Mediterranean area. The Cold War mentality made of this strategic concept a non-starter politically.

Fifteen years later, with the end of the Cold War, in the Charter of Paris 1990, CSCE participating states reiterated that they will continue efforts to strengthen security and cooperation in the Mediterranean as an important factor for stability in Europe.

An initiative contemporary to the Charter of Paris was that launched by the Foreign Ministers of Italy and Spain, Gianni de Michelis and Francisco Ordo'�es, for the setting up of a Conference for Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean (CSCM) inspired by the OSCE experiment. The purpose behind the CSCM was that of grouping the then European Community, the Balkans, North Africa, as well as the Soviet Union and the United States for the purposes of security and cooperation through the Mediterranean.

The CSCM failed because it lacked the support of the United States of America and faced the skepticism of some European countries. The Middle East tension and the Second Gulf War did the rest. We re-launched the idea within the Inter-Parliamentary Union and it still struggles on with little hope of success.

Another initiative aimed at developing this Mediterranean personality was launched by Malta in 1990 for the setting up of a Council for the Mediterranean

involving all riparian states having a ministerial dimension, a parliamentary assembly and a strong people to people approach involving therein the civil society including NGOs and the universities.

Fran'�ois Mitterrand proposed the Western Mediterranean Forum, the so-called 5 + 5 involving Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia on the one part and France, Portugal, Spain, Italy, and later Malta on the European part. The first meeting held at foreign minister level was in Rome in 1990. The second meeting which I attended was in Algiers in 1991. The third meeting to be held in Tunis in 1992 failed to materialise partly because of sanctions against Libya following Lockerbie, terrorism in Algeria, as well as lack of coordination within the Arab-Maghreb Union. There is at the moment some talk at reviving the 5 + 5 mainly through Libya's interest in this forum as distinct from its non-participation in the Euro-Med process.

The early nineties saw the birth of another forum – the so-called- Mediterranean forum, aimed at bringing together in GYMNICK form the foreign ministers of eleven states consisting of Algeria, Egypt, France, Greece, Italy, Malta, Morocco, Portugal, Spain, Tunisia and Turkey. It still survives and thrives.

The problem for the Mediterranean Forum is that great part of its work has been taken by the Barcelona process. Yet it serves as a core group within the Barcelona process bringing together countries with a Mediterranean belongingness from both sides of this Sea.

In 1991, the North Atlantic Alliance, in its Strategic Concept, stated that "the stability and peace of the countries on the southern periphery of Europe are important for the security of the Alliance". And in December 1994, NATO foreign ministers declared that they were prepared to promote dialogue and establish contacts on a case to case basis between the Alliance and Mediterranean non-member countries with a view to contributing to the strengthening of regional stability. This initiative has had so far very limited success.

I have overviewed developments in the region for the twenty years following Helsinki I which witnessed the momentous events of the fall of the Berlin Wall, the end of bi-polar confrontation, the winding up of the Warsaw Pact, the end of the Soviet Union and the birth of the Euro-Med process in November 1995 at Barcelona.

We were rich in initiatives, we are poor in results.

The momentous events referred to did not diminish or solve the problems of the region. The end of the bi-polar confrontation did not solve the problems of the Middle East. It compounded problems in the Former Yugoslavia leading to its disintegration in flames and death, problems of fundamentalism struck terror in Algeria and other Arab countries. The problem of a divided Cyprus remains.

The Euro-Med partnership, bringing together EU member states and twelve Mediterranean countries, Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey and the Palestinian National Authority, is a valid exercise in strategic dialogue. The inclusion of the Palestinian National Authority is an assertion that the Middle East peace process cannot succeed if the Palestinian component is ignored in this Mediterranean context.

The Barcelona document envisages three different baskets of cooperation: the economic and financial cooperation, the social and cultural dimension, the political and security partnership.

The economic dimension apart from a substantial amount provided by the European Union ($6.1 billion) and an equal amount in loans by the European Investment Bank envisages by 2010 a Euro-Med Free Trade Area. The social and cultural dimension aims at a people to people approach, a civil society cooperation and a strong reference to human rights. The political and security partnership is working on a Charter for Peace and Stability originally proposed by Malta and France and which, following contributions by member states, may become the cornerstone of the political partnership.

This Charter may be approved at the Euro-Med Ministerial Conference to be held in Marseilles in November 2000.

Five years after Barcelona it is quite legitimate to ask what results have been achieved. Are we satisfied with the progress made? Are we encountering difficulties in the process?

My own view is that the Process is moving on a hiccups basis, that there are in-built difficulties in its structure, it has no secretariat apart from Brussels, the Chair moves on rotation within the EU structure and with no alternation with the Mediterranean partners.

But fundamental to the slow progress achieved in the Barcelona Process loom the problems of the Middle East. If there is a measure of progress in the talks between Israel and the Palestinians, between Israel and Syria, these are reflected positively in the Euro-Med process. If, on the other hand, the situation there is negative, the Euro-Med process comes to a stall. At the momentthe peace process launched in Oslo is in shambles.

For a strategy of peace in the Mediterranean is directly dependent on Middle East events. If the issues affecting the observance of UN resolutions, in particular 242 and 338, are ignored or not pursued with vigour, we are bound to fail in the region and beyond.

For the recognition of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people has a resonance which goes far beyond their suffering. It affects the Arab world, it affects the Islamic world, it affects the oil-producing states of the Middle East. The existence of Israel within secure and guaranteed frontiers is not only in terms of UN resolutions and an act of justice towards the people of Israel but has also a transatlantic dimension involving the United States.

A strategy for the Mediterranean depends therefore on factors which have to be pursued both on a short term and long term basis with vigour and determination.

A Mediterranean strategy in the short term should see the European Union much more involved in the Middle East peace process. We do recognise the efforts put by the present US administration to mediate in the crisis. I think that President Clinton has dedicated himself in a genuine search for a solution. Indeed, we may also say that we are so near to a solution and at the same time so far. We have witnessed in these last few weeks a return to the past.

More than a hundred killed on the Palestinian side amongst whom many children is a serious indictment to the use of excessive force against stone-slinging youths. The lynching of two Israeli soldiers has given further crudeness to the situation. The mistrust that has been re-created between Israelis and Palestinians is a negative legacy which will hang like an albatross around our neck for years to come.

This is why I believe that Europe has a fundamental role to play in this strategy for peace. We understand the difficulties facing any Israeli Government in reaching a solution. Two thousand years of diaspora, 6,000,000 killed in Nazi concentration camps, and the yearning for Jerusalem cannot be cancelled from the collective memory of the people of Israel. But there is also an equally collective memory of millions of Palestinians who have been deprived of their homes exiled from their country, of the many Palestinians who are living the humiliation of being refugees in their own territory. A resolution to these problems is a must for a Mediterranean strategy for peace. The european Union and the Mediterranean countries in particular, have a specific responsibility to contribute to the peace process.

But beyond the short term lies a long term strategy, that of creating wealth on both sides of the Mediterranean. The southern side of the Mediterranean cannot continue to be an exporter of migrants – often unwanted and illegal entrants in European countries – but through an intelligent globalisation process bring an economic revival leading to a higher GDP per capita which will ensure, as a result enhanced economic relations on both sides of this historical sea. Within this context, the Free Trade Area envisaged by the year 2010 between the European Union and the Mediterranean countries in partnership will create a common market of over 600,000,000 people, in itself an important goal for prosperity. It is also of the essence for this Mediterranean strategy to succeed to have a people to people approach. The recognition that human rights are common to peoples on both sides of the Mediterranean is also of the essence for future understanding.

Whilst many in the Arab world do speak European languages, in particular English and French, comparatively few are those who in Europe who speak Arabic. For this social strategy to have its desired impact we have to ensure the evolution of a Mediterranean personality, in particular through exchanges between Mediterranean universities, the twinning of Mediterranean cities, the awareness that we have a common heritage to uphold. The Euro-Med policies may bring about the changes and developments within this strategy.

The implementation of the principles and promises of the Barcelona process have exposed the enormous difficulties that exist in fostering closer bonds even among neighbours. The Partnership has shown, however, that where there is the necessary political will and leadership there is scope to move ahead in a comprehensive approach.

The Euro-Med Process is in itself a strategy for the Mediterranean. But it is a strategy that has not yet materialised the notion of "thinking Mediterranean".

By "thinking Mediterranean" I refer to the acknowledgement that the States bordering this sea and / or forming part of the historical-cultural milieu of the Mediterranean, possess a common Mediterranean heritage, retain common interests and target common concerns. It follows naturally that they form a common voice of interest and concern. This voice is today not heard.

Creating this common voice does not necessarily envisage the establishment of new political forum. It means that Mediterranean countries acknowledge the reality that this sea act not as a divide but as a bridge of understanding, as a golden thread which brings unity in diversity.

On the political front, this would translate into a cohesive "Agenda for the Mediterranean" to be pursued by countries that have in their interests the peace and prosperity of this region.

History has taught us the realities of a Pax Romana. Before the Second World War, the Pax Britannica was reflected from Gibraltar to the Suez Canal. The Pax Americana was mentioned during the last decades. But what we need in the Mediterranean is a Pax Mediterranea, the will for peace and stability brought about primarily by the Mediterranean countries themselves.

We are forming the web of socio-economic political bonds that can create a truly Euro-Mediterranean platform of debate, dialogue and co-operation.

My country has proven its commitment to the fate of the Mediterranean. We do not believe that the Mediterranean should continue to be a divide between a European North and an Arab plus Israel South. We do not cease being Europeans in belonging to the Mediterranean. Arab countries do not cease belonging to the Arab world if they bring positively to bear their Mediterranean personality; nor can Israel live in isolation being deprived of its Mediterranean standing.

Malta has applied to join the European Union and my Government is envisaging forming part thereof in the first enlargement. Malta in the European Union will add to the Mediterranean dimension of the Union.

For our geography has placed us at the heart of the Mediterranean, our history in the heart of Europe.

It is not illogical that we seek through a Mediterranean strategy that the Euro-Mediterranean heart beats in unison. For Mediterranean politics can be made the art of the possible. Our commitment for a Mediterranean strategy can make peace a reality.